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within the boundaries of parental discretion.'2 Finally, the recognition of such a cause of action would have supported a claim for
24
contribution, thereby preventing the tortured application of Dole. ,
In view of the confusion and possible inequity which seem likely to
result,'2 it is hoped that the Court of Appeals will reexamine its
position.
John F. Farmer

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW

CPL § 200.50: Court of Appeals clarifies requirements of factual
statement in indictment
Section 200.50 of the CPL sets forth the requisite form and
content of an indictment and mandates that it contain a "plain and
concise factual statement" which supports all elements of the crime
charged with sufficient preciseness to afford the defendant notice of
the conduct for which he stands accused. 26 The absence of specific
I See 46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring); note 108 and accompanying text supra.Judge Gabrielli noted that the major difficulty
the courts have faced in negligent supervision cases has been the establishment of an acceptable standard of good parental care. 46 N.Y.2d at 343, 385 N.E.2d at 1275, 413 N.Y.S.2d at
347 (Gabrielli, J., concurring). This difficulty is drastically reduced, however, when the
parental conduct can be classified as grossly negligent. Id. (Gabrielli, J., concurring). In the
event of egregious parental conduct within the parent-child relationship, the weighty policy
considerations in respect to harmonious family relations become subordinated to the more
compelling interests of providing a remedy for the injured child and allocating to a marginally
negligent third party his rightful share of the damages. See id. at 344, 385 N.E.2d at 1276,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 348 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
Moreover, it is submitted that, were the Court to define a standard of care to be applied
to parents whose conduct toward their children is considered gross, reckless or wanton, parents would not be faced with an undue burden of shielding themselves from liability. While
a cognizable action for mere negligent supervision might cause parents to be overprotective
and "result in a society of reliant individuals, incapable of making responsible judgments
respecting the propriety of their own actions," 42 BaooKLYN L. REv. 125, 136 (1975), it is
unlikely that those concerns would develop under Judge Gabrielli's gross negligence standard.
"'i See notes 84 & 110 and accompanying text supra.
'2 See notes 113-114 and accompanying text supra.
25 CPL § 200.50(7)(a) (Supp. 1978-1979) states that an indictment must contain
[a] plain and concise factual statement in each court which, without allegations
of an evidentiary nature,
(a) asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the
defendant's or defendants' commission thereof with sufficient precision to clearly
apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the
accusation .

...

The Court of Appeals, in People v. Farson, 244 N.Y. 413, 155 N.E. 724 (1927), stated that
an indictment would be sufficient
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statutory guidelines has led to conflicting results by lower courts in
their efforts to formulhte minimum requirements regarding the content of the factual statement. 27 Recently, in People v. Iannone,,2s
if it identifies the charge against the defendant so that his conviction or acquittal
may prevent a subsequent charge for the same offense; notifies him of the nature
and character of the crime charged against him to the end that he may prepare his
defense; and enables the court upon conviction to pronounce judgment according
to the right of the case.
Id. at 417, 155 N.E. at 725; see CPL § 200.50, commentary at 236 (McKinney 1971); A. WEBER,
NEW YORK CRmIHAL PROCEDURE 62 (1947).
The CPL defines an indictment as a "written accusation by a grand jury . . .filed
with a superior court, which charges one or more defendants with the commission of one or
more offenses, at least one of which is a crime, and serves as a basis for prosecution thereof."
CPL § 1.20(3), (19); see People v. R., 78 Misc. 2d 616, 356 N.Y.S.2d 1006, 1008-09 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County), affl'd, 47 App. Div. 2d 599, 365 N.Y.S.2d 998 (1st Dep't 1974); CPL § 200.10
(Supp. 1978-1979). See generally Ludwig, Improving New York's New CriminalProcedure
Law, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 387, 410-14 (1971).
Although the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution requires indictment by
grand jury, this provision does not apply to the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884). Thus, a defendant in a state proceeding derives any right to grand jury indictment
from state constitutions. See id. The New York Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall
be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . . . unless on indictment of a
grand jury." N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6. Prior to its 1974 amendment, the right to an indictment
was deemed non-waivable. Simonson v. Cahn, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 4, 261 N.E.2d 246, 247, 313
N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (1970). In 1974, however, the section was amended to allow a person to waive
indictment "with the consent of the district attorney," for crimes not "punishable by death
or life imprisonment." N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
Under the former Code of Criminal Procedure, two types of indictments were authorized.
The "long form" indictment of CCP § 275, which required the title of the action, the name
or description of the defendant and a plain concise statement of the acts or omission constituting the crime, contained many of the same elements as § 200.50 of the CPL. The use of a
"short form" indictment, on the other hand, merely required that the indictment contain no
more than a bare statement of the crime charged without any factual allegations. See CCP §
295-b (1958); L. PAPERNO & A. GoL sTEiN, CRnAL PRocEDuRE iN NEW YORK § 164 (1960).
The constitutionality of the "short form" indictment was sustained in People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890 (1930). The Bogdanoff majority reasoned that, since a bill of
particulars was required if requested by a defendant, any inadequacy in the indictment could
be corrected by the district attorney's clarification of the acts constituting the crime. Id. at
24, 171 N.E. at 893. The dissent argued that the "short form" indictment did not give the
defendant adequate notice of the charges against him because it did not require the acts
constituting the crime to be stated. Id. at 37, 171 N.E. at 898 (Crane, J., dissenting). The
dissent did not consider the bill of particulars a sufficient safeguard to protect these rights
because the defendant was forced to request it, and, "[n]ot having been found on the oath
of the grand jury, a bill of particulars cannot cure the failure of the indictment to sufficiently
inform the defendant of the charge against him." Id. at 38, 171 N.E. at 898 (Crane, J.,
dissenting). With the enactment of the CPL, the "short form" indictment was eliminated.
Ch. 996, § 200.50; [1970] N.Y. Laws 2 (McKinney) (current version at CPL § 200.50 (Supp.
1978-1979)).
' Some courts concluded that § 200.50(7) requires a more detailed statement of facts
than was required under the CCP. E.g., People v. Cook, 81 Misc. 2d 235, 239, 365 N.Y.S.2d
611, 616 (Onondaga County Ct. 1975); People v. Ebasco Serv., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 787-88,
354 N.Y.S.2d 807, 811 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974). Similarly, other courts found that §
k1
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the Court of Appeals concluded that, under section 200.50(7), an
indictment need only contain a statement alleging that the defendant committed every element of the crime for which he has been
indicted at a particular time and place.' 9 The Iannone Court held,
however, that the defendants' failure either to object to the sufficiency of the factual statement or request a bill of particulars at the
proper time barred appellate review of the merits.3 0
In Iannone, two defendants were separately indicted and tried
for conspiracy and criminal usury.'31 Both indictments, carefully
following the language of the applicable section of the Penal Law,
asserted facts supporting every material element of the crimes. 32
One defendant moved to dismiss the indictment at sentencing, con' 33
tending "that it failed to set forth facts which constitute a crime.'
200.50(7) precludes the mere recitation of the language of the criminal statute. E.g., People
v. Barnes, 44 App. Div. 2d 740, 740, 354 N.Y.S.2d 459, 461 (3d Dep't 1974); People v.
Fernandez, 93 Misc. 2d 127, 134-35, 402 N.Y.S.2d 940, 946-47 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978);
People v. Smith, 90 Misc. 2d 495, 497, 395 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932-33 (Oneida County Ct. 1977);
see People v. Hines, 60 App. Div. 2d 656' 400 N.Y.S.2d 559 (2d Dep't 1977).
In contrast, other courts have permitted an indictment to parallel the criminal statute,
provided the statute defined the crime. E.g., People v. Barton, 51 App. Div. 2d 1044, 1044,
381 N.Y.S.2d 329, 330 (2d Dep't 1976); People v. Schwenk, 92 Misc. 2d 331, 335-36, 400
N.Y.S.2d 291, 294-95 (Suffolk County Ct. 1977); People v. D'Arcy, 79 Misc. 2d 113, 118, 359
N.Y.S.2d 453, 463 (Alleghany County Ct. 1974).
'' 45 N.Y.2d 589, 384 N.E.2d 656, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1978).
i2 Id.
at 599, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
'' Id. at 600, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
,' Id. at 592, 384 N.E.2d at 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 113; see N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 105.00,
190.40 (Supp. 1978-1979); note 132 infra. Two actions were decided by the Iannone Court People v. Iannone and People v. Corozzo.
'- 45 N.Y.2d at 592, 384 N.E.2d at 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13. The indictments in each
case were very similar. Defendant Iannone was indicted by an instrument which read as
follows:
AND THE GRAND JURY AFORESAID, by this Indictment, further accuse the
above named defendants of the crime of CRIMINAL USURY, in violation of section
190.40 of the Penal Law, committed as follows: The defendants, acting in concert
and in aid of one another, from and between, in and about August of 1974 to
December of 1974, in the County of Suffolk, not being authorized and permitted
by law to do so, knowingly charged, took and received money as interest on a loan
of a sum of money from a certain individual at a rate exceeding twenty-five percenturn per annum and the equivalent rate for a shorter period.
Id. at 592, 384 N.E.2d at 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 112. The text of the indictment paralleled
the wording of section 190.40 of the New York Penal Law, which states:
A person is guilty of criminal usury in the second degree when, not being authorized
or permitted to do so, he knowingly charges, takes or receives any money or other
property as interest on the loan . . . , at a rate exceeding twenty-five per centum
per annum or the equivalent rate for a longer or shorter period.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 1975). Courts have been in conflict over whether an
indictment which restates the penal law is valid. See note 127 supra.
"1 45 N.Y.2d at 592-93, 384 N.E.2d at 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13.
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The lower court's denial of the motion was affirmed by the appellate
division.'34 The second defendant appealed after a jury trial and first
argued that the indictment was insufficient before the Court of
Appeals.'
A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. 3'
Judge Gabrielli, writing for the Court, noted that although no question of law had been preserved for their consideration, if the merits
had been reached, the indictments would have been upheld as sufficient. 7 Judge Gabrielli observed that, while the indictment qua
document has traditionally protected several constitutionally guaranteed rights,131 the state constitution does not require that this be
accomplished exclusively by the indictment. 39 As long as some
means of protecting these substantive guarantees are provided, the
form of such provisions is immaterial. 40 Recognizing that there are
sufficient safeguards with respect to some of these rights,' the
Iannone Court emphasized that by virtue of section 200.90 of the
CPL,42 which establishes the right to demand a bill of particulars,
lu Id. at 592, 384 N.E.2d at 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
13 Id.

Id. at 601, 384 N.E.2d at 664, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
Id. at 593, 384 N.E.2d at 659, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 113; see note 150 infra.
' Id. at 594, 384 N.E.2d at 667, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 113. Judge Gabrielli noted that the
indictment has traditionally served three functions. It notified the defendant of the charges
to permit him to prepare a defense. Id., 384 N.E.2d at 660, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 114 (citing People
v. Armlin, 6 N.Y.2d 231, 234, 160 N.E.2d 478, 480, 184 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (1959)). The
indictment also ensured, to some extent, that the defendant is in fact tried for the specific
crime which led to an indictment by the grand jury. 45 N.Y.2d at 594-95, 384 N.E.2d at 660,
412 N.Y.S.2d at 114. Finally, the indictment guarded against the possibility of the defendant
being tried twice for the same crime. Id. (citing People v. Williams, 243 N.Y. 162, 165, 153
N.E. 35, 36 (1926)).
13 45 N.Y.2d at 595, 384 N.E.2d at 661, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
1,0 Id.
"I Id. at 598, 384 N.E.2d at 662, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116. The Court emphasized that the
significance of the indictment as the traditional vehicle for the protection of a defendant's
fundamental rights, see note 138 supra, has been lessened by modern procedures. Id. As noted
by the Court, discovery in criminal cases provided by article 240 of the CPL has made it less
imperative that the indictment contain specific information, and the fear of double jeopardy
has been diminished by the practice of keeping full records of the proceedings. 45 N.Y.2d at
598, 384 N.E.2d at 662, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116. Furthermore, the Court observed that a defendant may move the court to allow him to inspect the grand jury minutes if he believes that
the indictment charges him with a crime differing from that on which the grand jury heard
evidence. Id.; see CPL § 210.30 (1971). It should be noted, however, that the granting of such
motions is within the trial courts' discretion. Id. § 210.30(4).
"2 CPL § 200.90 (1971 & Supp. 1978-1979). The function of a bill of particulars is to
provide clarification of matters stated in the indictment, People v. Davis, 41 N.Y.2d 678, 67980, 363 N.E.2d 572, 573, 394 N.Y.S.2d 865, 867 (1977), and is not intended to serve as an
alternative means of discovery or to enlighten the defendant to the prosecutor's proof. People
v. Raymond G., 54 App. Div. 2d 596, 387 N.Y.S.2d 174 (3d Dep't 1976); see CPL § 200.90(3)
930
'
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a defendant is fully capable of obtaining information necessary to
prepare his defense. 4 ' Noting that this right had been a material
consideration in sustaining the constitutionality of the discontinued
"short form" indictment of the CCP, which required no more than
a recitation of the crime charged,' the Court opined that these
considerations were still compelling.' According to the Court, the
essential purpose of the indictment qua document is merely to apprise the defendant of the crime for which he has been indicted, and
therefore "'the indictment need only allege- where, when and what
the defendant did.' "146 While declaring that utilizing the statutory
language defining the crime in the factual statement would generally suffice, 147 the Court warned that with some broadly-phrased
statutes, greater specificity would be required. 48 In such instances,
Judge Gabrielli cautioned the lower courts to safeguard the defendant's right to be notified of the charges against him and of his right
to acquire further information either by a bill of particulars or discovery.149 Addressing the issue whether the defendants waived their
(1971). The information that the prosecutor is obligated to furnish a defendant is strictly
limited to the particulars requested by the defendant and approved by the court in its
discretion. See CPL § 200.90(3); People v. Raymond G., 54 App. Div. 2d 596, 387 N.Y.S.2d
174 (3d Dep't 1976).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 597-98, 384 N.E.2d at 662, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116; see People v. Fitzgerald,
45 N.Y.2d 574, 384 N.E.2d 649, 412 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1978); notes 145-146 infra.
14 See note 126 supra.
145 45 N.Y.2d at 597-98, 384 N.E.2d at 662, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 115-16. CPL § 200.90(3)
provides in part: "[Ilf the court is satisfied that any or all of the items of information
requested are necessary to enable the defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense,
it must grant the motion as to every such necessary item." The Iannone Court viewed the
effect of this provision and the sections of the CCP relating to "short form" indictments as
the same, 45 N.Y.2d at 597-98, 384 N.E.2d at 662, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116, since under the CCP
the trial court also was required to determine whether the information requested was necessary. Id. Coupled with the other safeguards provided by the CPL, see note 141 supra, the
Court concluded that an indictment lacking a detailed factual statement is not unconstitutional. 45 N.Y.2d at 598-99, 384 N.E.2d at 662-63, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
"4IId. at 598, 384 N.E.2d at 662-63, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116 (quoting R. PILE_, NEW YORK
CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE CPL 302 (1972)). Recognizing that the requirements of CPL §
200.50(7) are similar to the long form indictment, 45 N.Y.2d at 598, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412
N.Y.S.2d at 116; see note 126 supra, the Court concluded that indictments are sufficient if
they "charge each and every element of the crime . . . , and allege that the defendants
committed the acts which constitute that crime at a specified place during a specified time
period." 45 N.Y.2d at 599, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116; accord, People v. Fitzgerald, 45 N.Y.2d 574, 384 N.E.2d 649, 412 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1978).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 599, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 116.
14 Id.
at 599, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117; see note 158 infra.
141 45 N.Y.2d at 599-600, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117. The Court further
warned that prosecutors should avoid using indictments that, although technically sufficient,
would not provide sufficient information to allow a defendant to properly prepare for trial,
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right to review, 5 ' the Court held that, absent any assertion by the
defendant that he was not informed of the crime with which he was
charged, the failure to object to the insufficiency of the indictment
at the proper time resulted in a waiver. 51
By employing the same rationale which supported the constitutionality of the "short form" indictment it is submitted that the
Iannone Court improperly resurrected this type of indictment and
interpreted CPL 200.50 contrary to the intent of the draftsmen. The
staff comments of the commission charged with the revision of the
CCP indicate that the simplified indictment was not retained because it failed to afford adequate notice to the defendant of the
nature of the crime charged.1 2 Moreover, the draftsmen of the CPL
were of the opinion that the sole function of an indictment was not
merely to provide notice.'5 3 It additionally should provide a factual
since they might impinge on "the defendant's right to be informed of the accusations against
him." Id. at 599, 384 N.E.2d at 663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
10 Id. at 600-01, 384 N.E.2d at 664, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (citing People v. Soto, 44 N.Y.2d
683, 376 N.E.2d 907, 405 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1978) (mem.)). The Court addressed the issue whether
an insufficient factual statement was a jurisdictional defect. This question was significant
because if a defective factual statement resulting in a jurisdictional defect, the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction could be raised at any time and would not be waived by failure to make
a timely objection. The Court found that an indictment contains a jurisdictional defect if,
"in essence, . . . it does not effectively charge the defendant with the commission of a
particular crime." 45 N.Y.2d at 600, 384 N.E.2d at 664, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 118.
1' 45 N.Y.2d at 600, 384 N.E.2d at 663-64, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117; see People v. Case, 42
N.Y.2d 98, 99-100, 365 N.E.2d 872, 873, 396 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (1977); People v. Scott, 3
N.Y.2d 148, 152-53, 143 N.E.2d 901, 904, 164 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711-12 (1957); People v. Koffroth,
2 N.Y.2d 807, 140 N.E.2d 742, 159 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1957); CPL § 255.20 (Supp. 1978-1979).
52The legal staff of the State of New York Temporary Commission on Revision stated
that the "short form" indictment was to be eliminated because it informed "the accused
nothing about the nature of the crime charged." PROPOSED NEw YORK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
LAW 170-71 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED CPLI, reprinted in N.Y. CmiM. PROC. LAW,
art. 200, commission staff comment at 115 (Consol. 1979) [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED
CPL, reprinted in CLS]. By discarding the "short form" indictment, the draftsmen of the
CPL apparently hoped to insure that a defendant is tried for the crime for which the grand
jury has issued the indictment and to avoid situations where a defendant is not given sufficient notice of the crimes with which he is charged. See, e.g., People v. Langford, 16 N.Y.2d
32, 209 N.E.2d 537, 261 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1965); People v. Berkowitz, 14 Misc. 2d 384, 178
N.Y.S.2d 119 (Kings County Ct.), affl'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 1031, 184 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't
1959). Accordingly, the draftsmen of the CPL required that the indictment contain a factual
statement. See PROPOSED CPL, supra, at 171, 172, reprinted in CLS at 115.
"I The draftsmen of the CPL believed that "[t]he primary function of an indictment
is to inform the defendant of the crime with which he is charged, and that it should do so
with sufficient fullness and clarity to enable him to prepare for trial.
... PROPOSED CPL,
supra note 152, at 172, reprinted in CLS at 146; see People v. Armlin, 6 N.Y.2d 231, 234, 160
N.E.2d 478, 480, 189 N.Y.S.2d 179, 181 (1969); People v. Farson, 244 N.Y. 413, 416, 155
N.E.2d 724, 725 (1927). In addition, it was intended that the indictment enable the defendant
to utilize the judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecution and permit the court to determine
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statement which on its face would "permi[t] the trial court to
determine whether the facts alleged [were] legally sufficient to
support a conviction.' ' 54
Notwithstanding lannone's questionable interpretation of
subsection 7, it appears that the decision will have a significant
effect on defendants' rights. lannone indicates that an indictment
need not always give notice of the specific acts constituting the
crime charged. As a consequence, a defendant frequently may have
the burden of requesting a bill of particulars. 1 5 Use of the bill of
particulars in this manner has been criticized in the past because
it "leaves the district attorney to determine of what the defendant
is accused." 5 ' It is possible, therefore, that a defendant could be
whether sufficient facts exist to support conviction. See PROPOSED CPL, supra note 152, at
172, reprinted in CLS at 146.
"' PROPOSED CPL, supra note 152, at 172 reprinted in CLS, at 146. In contrast to the
function of an indictment, the revision commission staff noted:
The sole function of a bill of particulars is to define more specifically the crime
or crimes charged in the indictment, or, in other words, to provide clarification of
certain matters set forth in the pleading . . . . A bill of particulars cannot, of
course, serve to amend an indictment, nor can it cure a defective pleading.
PROPOSED CPL, supra note 152, at 179, reprinted in CLS at 185.
A strong argument can be made in support of the theory that the draftsmen of the CPL
intended an insufficient factual statement to be a jurisdictional defect. Section 210.25 of the
CPL provides that an indictment should not be dismissed where the indictment can be cured
by amending technical flaws pursuant to § 200.70. Four substantive defects of an indictment,
however, cannot be amended: failure to state an offense, legal insufficiency of the factual
statement, misjoinder of offenses, and misjoinder of defendants. CPL § 200.70(2) (Supp.
1978-1979). Moreover, the latter defects may be grounds for dismissal of an indictment. See,
e.g., People v. Smith, 90 Misc. 2d 495, 395 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Oneida County Ct. 1977); People
v. Tripp, 79 Misc. 2d 583, 360 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Delaware County Ct.), affl'd, 46 App. Div. 2d
743, 360 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (3d Dep't 1974). Since the intent of the draftsmen of § 200.70 was to
"avoid technical objections not affecting a substantial right of the defendant," PROPOSED
CPL, supra note 152, at 177, reprinted in CLS at 174 (emphasis added), it can be argued that
the draftsmen considered the factual statement to be an essential part of the indictment and,
where insufficient, as a jurisdictional ground for dismissal. People v. Smith, 90 Misc. 2d 495,
497, 395 N.Y.S.2d 931, 932 (Oneida County Ct. 1977); accord, People v. Clough, 43 App. Div.
2d 451, 454, 353 N.Y.S.2d 260, 264 (3d Dep't 1974); People v. Bottcher, 93 Misc. 2d 417, 419,
402 N.Y.S.2d 934, 936 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1978). But see People v. Grimsley, 60 App.
Div. 2d 980, 980-81, 401 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (4th Dep't 1978) (mem.).
113Of course, the burden also will be on the defendant to commence discovery, or request
that the grand jury minutes be reviewed in order to determine the exact crime with which he
is charged. See note 141 supra.
,14People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 39, 171 N.E. 890, 899 (1930) (Crane, J., dissenting).
Judge Crane noted that "[a] bill of particulars is not . . . a part of the indictment. Not
having been found on the oath of the grand jury, a bill of particulars cannot cure the failure
of the indictment to sufficiently inform the defendant of the [crime chargedf." Id.:a s8.
(Crane, J., dissenting); see People v. Berkowitz, 14 Misc. 2d 384, 390, 178 N.Y.S.2d 119, 127
(Kings County Ct. 1958), affl'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 1031, 184 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2d Dep't 1959). This
view was adopted by the draftsmen of the CPL. See note 154 supra.
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convicted of a crime other than the one for which he was indicted.1 57
The Iannone Court's admonition to the lower courts to safeguard
defendants' rights through use of discovery and the bill of particulars does not appear to adequately resolve the above problems.'5 8
John F. Finston

CPL § 220.60(3): Defendant denied full evidentiary hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea where court record contains no indication of unfulfilled out-of-court promise
Section 220.60(3) of the CPL provides that a criminal defendant may, in the discretion of the court, withdraw a guilty plea prior
to the imposition of sentence.'59 The reluctance to exercise this dis157See

note 146 supra.
45 N.Y.2d at 599-600, 384 N.E.2d at-663, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 117. Although the defendants in lannone did not assert actual prejudice, the Court noted that, where this occurs
because of the paucity of information in an indictment and the defendant is actually unaware
of the crime with which he is charged, a conviction might not be sustained. Id. In such a case,
reviewability of the indictment may be necessary to ensure a fair opportunity for the defendant to prepare a defense.
'i' CPL § 220.60(3) (Supp. 1978-1979) states that:
At any time before the imposition of sentence, the court in its discretion may
permit a defendant who has entered a plea of guilty to the entire indictment or to
part of the indictment to withdraw such plea, and in such event the entire indictment, as it existed at the time of the plea of guilty, is restored.
Plea negotiations often have been categorized in two groups. In "charge bargaining" the
prosecutor may offer the defendant a reduced charge, with its concomitant lesser sentence,
in exchange for a plea of guilty. A variation on this method is the offer to dismiss some of
the charges against the defendant or to forego additional charges which might validly be
made. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971). In contrast, "sentence bargaining" involves an agreement by the prosecutor to
recommend a particular disposition to the sentencing court after the defendant has pleaded
guilty to the offense as originally charged. See People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227, 318 N.E.2d
784, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Berger, The Case Against
Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621, 621 (1976); Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal from a
Plea Bargain Conviction: A Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 663, 664-65 (1974).
By entering a plea, a defendant waives certain constitutional guarantees, see Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969);
Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927), including the right against selfincrimination, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964), to trial by jury, see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968), to confront and cross-examine witnesses of the state,
see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), to compel the presence of witnesses on his
behalf, see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967), to require the government to
prove their case beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and to
have only constitutionally obtained evidence used as part of the prosecution's case, see,
e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The right to plea bargain, however, is not a constitutional right, Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), and not all constitutional rights
'5'

